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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
David Charles Anderson entered a conditional plea of guilty to possessing a controlled
substance, expressly reserving his right to appeal the district court's order denying his motion to
suppress.

On appeal, Mr. Anderson argues that he was unlawfully detained when, without

reasonable suspicion or other constitutional justification, an officer approached him while he was
sitting in his parked vehicle, requested his identification, and then retained it to run his license
information through dispatch. He further argues that the evidence later discovered was the result
of the officer's unlawful conduct and that suppression was required under the exclusionary rule.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following facts were established at the suppression hearing. 1 Coeur d'Alene Police
Officer Nathan Herbig was out on patrol at about 9:30 at night when he noticed a driver Mr. Anderson - sitting in a pickup truck parked in the lot next to a bus stop. (Tr., p.8, L.2 p.11, L.11.) Officer Herbig was not investigating criminal activity in the area, nor did he hold
any suspicions of criminal activity. (Tr., p.18, Ls.3-16; p.46, Ls.16-18.) Officer Herbig pulled
into the lot and parked, walked up to the pickup truck, and Mr. Anderson rolled down his
window and greeted him. (Ex., 1:55-2:00; Tr., p.8, L.2 - p.11, L.11.) Officer Herbig asked
Mr. Anderson if he was waiting for someone, and Mr. Anderson answered that he was waiting
for his girlfriend to arrive on the bus so he could give her a ride home before working his shift at
McDonald's. 2 (Ex., 2:00-15.)

1

The State called two witnesses, Officer Herbig and his patrol supervisor, Sergeant Jared
Reneau; the DVD of Officer Herbig's bodycam was also admitted at the suppression hearing.
(Tr., p.12, Ls.12-15; Ex.I.) The district court ruled from the bench, and its findings are
contained in the transcript of the suppression hearing, ("Tr."), at Tr., p.36, L.20 - p.38, L.13.)
2
Mr. Anderson was wearing a work uniform and hat bearing the McDonald's logo. (Ex.I, 2:00 23:41.)

1

Officer Herbig then asked Mr. Anderson for his I.D. and Mr. Anderson handed over his
driver's license. (Ex., 2:10-15.) Later, Officer Herbig testified that his reason for requesting the
license was "to identify who I was talking to" (Tr., p.13, Ls.13-14), and "to protect myself from
any allegations or anything to that effect" (Tr., p.19, Ls.12-15), and that by running the name
through dispatch he would have "a log of the name." (Tr., p.20, Ls.7-9).
Officer Herbig radioed dispatch and provided Mr. Anderson's information from his
driver's license and learned that Mr. Anderson was on probation, and he returned the license to
Mr. Anderson. (Ex., 2:15-55.) Upon returning the license, Officer Herbig asked Mr. Anderson,
"Are you still on probation? What was that for?" (Tr., p.13,Ls.14-17; Ex.I, 3:30-35.)
Mr. Anderson answered that he was on probation for possessing methamphetamine, a controlled
substance charge, from about two years prior. (Ex.I, 3:35-40.) Officer Herbig then questioned
Mr. Anderson in detail about his prior drug use and requested the name of his probation officer,
which Mr. Anderson provided. (Ex.I, 3:40-5:11.) Officer Herbig asked Mr. Anderson ifhe had
anything illegal on him, and then asked, "Are you good with me checking, that way if your PO
asks me I can tell him, 'Yeah, I checked him. He was good with it. He was cooperative."'
(Ex.I, 5:00-5:10.)
Mr. Anderson answered all of Officer Herbig's questions and said "yep" to the request
for consent to search. (Ex., 5:15.) Officer Herbig had Mr. Anderson step out of the vehicle and
searched his person, then asked if Mr. Anderson was okay with him searching the vehicle and
Mr. Anderson said, "yeah, go ahead." (Ex., 5:15-40.) Officer Herbig searched the vehicle and
found a small baggie of containing white powdery substance, then arrested Mr. Anderson for
possession of methamphetamine. (Ex.I, 5:40-18:55.) The amount of time between the officer's
request for the license and the discovery of the drugs was approximately sixteen minutes. (Ex. I,
2:55 - 18:55.)
2

Mr. Anderson filed a motion to suppress the evidence.

(R., pp.33-42.)

He claimed

Officer Herbig violated his rights against unreasonable seizures, as protected by Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, and the United States Constitution's Fourth Amendment,
when Officer Herbig detained him in order to run a driver's license check without reasonable
suspicion or other constitutionally-reasonable justification. (R., pp.33-42.)

Mr. Anderson

argued that the subsequent discovery of the drug evidence in the vehicle was the tainted "fruit"
of Officer Herbig's intentional and flagrant violation his constitutional rights, and that
suppression of that evidence was required under Idaho's exclusionary rule, in accordance with

State v. Cohagen, 162 Idaho 717, 720 (2017). (R., pp.33-42.) In his briefing, he further argued
that the State could not carry its burden to establish the "attenuation" exception to the
exclusionary rule under the facts of this case. (R., pp.33-42.)
In response to the motion, the State argued two points. First, it argued that Officer
Herbig's request for Mr. Anderson's driver's license and retention of the license to run it through
dispatch was constitutionally reasonable because the contact was consensual, at least up to the
point when the identification was requested, and that no reasonable suspicion was therefore
requested under State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491 (1992), and State v. Landreth, 139 Idaho 986,
988 (Ct. App. 2004). (R., pp.47-57.) At the hearing, the State presented testimony from Officer
Herbig, which mirrored that of his supervisor's testimony, that he requested the license and ran
it through dispatch "to identify who I was talking to" (Tr., p.13, Ls.13-14), and "to protect
myself from any allegations or anything to that effect" (Tr., p.19, Ls.12-15), and to create "a log of
the name" for future reference (Tr., p.20, Ls. 7-9). The district court accepted these reasons as
adequate justification for conducting the license check. (Tr., p.47, Ls.1-23.) The State presented
no evidence or argument that the officer possessed facts sufficient to provide reasonable
suspicion of a law infraction or other wrongdoing. (See generally R., pp.47-56; Tr., p.5, L.4 3

37, L.19.) Nor did the State claim or present evidence to show that Officer Herbig had reason to
believe Mr. Anderson was in need of assistance or that the officer was otherwise carrying out his
community caretaker duties. (See generally R., pp.47-56; Tr., p.5, L.4 - 37, L.19.)
Second, the State argued that the drug evidence was obtained as the result of a search of
Mr. Anderson's vehicle, conducted pursuant to Mr. Anderson's valid consent, and therefore the
drug evidence was admissible. (R., pp.56-57.) The State presented no alternative theory or
argument for the application of any exception to the exclusionary rule, in the event the officer's
conduct was found to amount to an unlawful detention. (See generally R., pp.47-57; Tr., p.36,
L.20 - p.38, L. 13.) Notably, the State did not cite Cohagan or address the question whether
there was sufficient attenuation between the request for identification and the discovery of the
drugs. (See generally R., pp.47-57; Tr., p.36, L.20- p.38, L.13.)
The district court denied Mr. Anderson's suppression motion.

(Tr., p.48, Ls.10-

13; R., p.69.) In a ruling from the bench, the district court concluded that the officer's request
for and retention of Mr. Anderson's identification did not amount to a detention, finding that the
officer's request was made in a friendly manner and that Mr. Anderson had "voluntarily"
provided his driver's license in response. (Tr., p.46, Ls.16-25.) The district court additionally
concluded that, in any event the officer's conduct in requesting Mr. Anderson's license "was an
entirely reasonable request." (Tr., p.46, L.3 - p.47, L.9.) The district court specifically ruled
that the officer's retention of the license did not amount to a detention that required reasonable
suspicion. (Tr., p.46, Ls.12-15.) The district court found that the detention
was for a brief time of just identifying who they're dealing with. And both officers
explained some of the reasons why they do that. So they know who they're dealing
with, there's safety concerns, possible liability concerns, who knows. And in this
case it was a very de minimis detention of that driver's license or the ID that was
presented.

4

(Tr., p.47, L.23 - p.48, L.3.)
The district court went on to conclude that the State had met its burden of showing that
Mr. Anderson gave valid, voluntary consent to search the vehicle. (Tr., p.47, L.10 - p.48, L.9.)
The district court made no alternative findings regarding whether the State had shown sufficient
attenuation. (See generally Tr., p.46, L.3 - p.48, L.9.)
Mr. Anderson entered a conditional guilty plea to possessing a controlled substance,
expressly reserving his right to challenge the district court's decision on appeal. (R., pp.64, 67;
Tr., p.51, Ls.18-23.) The district court sentenced him to a suspended term of six years, with
three years fixed, and placed him on probation.
(R., p.83.)

5

(R., p.72.) Mr. Anderson timely appealed.

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Anderson's motion to suppress, where the evidence
discovered was the fruit of the officer's suspicionless, unjustified detention of Mr. Anderson, and
the State failed to establish the applicability of any exception to the exclusionary rule?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Anderson's Motion To Suppress Because The
Evidence Discovered Was The Fruit Of The Officer's Unconstitutional Detention, And The State
Failed To Establish The Applicability Of Any Exception To The Exclusionary Rule

A.

Introduction
Officer Herbig unlawfully detained Mr. Anderson when, without suspecting him of any

traffic violation or other wrongdoing, or that he was in need of assistance, the officer walked up
to Mr. Anderson who was sitting in his parked vehicle, and asked him for identification, took his
driver's license, and then ran the license through police dispatch.

Because the subsequent

discovery of the evidence was the result of the officer's unlawful detention, and in the absence of
a showing of sufficient attenuation, the exclusionary rule required suppression of that evidence.
The district court's denial of suppression should be reversed.

B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

the standard of review is bifurcated. State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 720 (1017).

The

appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact, unless they are clearly erroneous, and
freely reviews the trial court's application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found.

Id.

C.

Officer Herbig's Conduct Violated Mr. Anderson's Fourth Amendment Rights
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the right of the people

to be free from unreasonable seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717,
721 (2017); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 (1992). When, as in this case, a defendant seeks to
suppress evidence obtained as the result of an illegal seizure, the defendant bears the initial

7

burden to show a seizure occurred. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843 (2004). The burden then
shifts to the State to demonstrate that the seizure was constitutionally reasonable. Id.

1.

Officer Herbig's Request For And Retention Of Mr. Anderson's Identification
Amounted To A "Seizure" Within Meaning Of The Fourth Amendment

While not all encounters with police amount to a Fourth Amendment "seizure," a seizure
occurs "when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen."

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (quoting

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n.16 (1968)). There is a "show of authority" when the words or
actions of an officer would convey to a reasonable person that the officer was ordering him or
her to restrict his or her movement. State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817 (2004) (citing California v.

Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)). The crucial test is whether the police conduct would "have
communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and
go about his business." Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434.
It is well-settled that a driver is not free to disregard an officer's request for identification

but is legally obligated to surrender his license to the officer. State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717,
724-25 (2017); State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491 (1992); State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 526
(Ct. App. 1991). It is also settled law that, upon surrendering his license to the officer and until
the license is returned to him, an individual is "seized" within the meaning for the Fourth
Amendment. Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 724-25; Page, 140 Idaho at 843; Osborne, 121 Idaho at
526.
Here, the district court found, and the undisputed evidence shows, that Officer Herbig
approached Mr. Anderson and asked for his identification, and that Mr. Anderson handed over
his license. (Tr., pp.142, Ls.1-12.) Under the controlling precedent, and as State conceded in the

8

district court,3 Mr. Anderson was not free to disregard the officer's request but was required by
statute to surrender his license to the officer. See State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 524
(Ct. App. 1991) (concluding the driver of a parked vehicle was "seized" when the officer
requested his license, since he was obligated by statute, I.C. § 49-316, to comply with the
officer's request and could not drive away without violating the law.) He therefore was "seized"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and his detention continued while officer retained
his license and until the license was returned. Godwin, 121 Idaho at 493 (a detention occurs
when an officer retains a driver's license); Page, 140 Idaho at 844 (same). The district court's
contrary conclusion, that Mr. Anderson was not detained because he voluntarily handed the
officer his license,4 was error as a matter of fact and as a matter of law.
Because Mr. Anderson was "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the
State bore the burden to justify the seizure as constitutionally reasonable. State v. Page, 140
Idaho 841, 843 (2004). As demonstrated below, the State failed to carry its burden.
2.

The State Failed To Carry Its Burden Of Demonstrating That The Seizure Was
Reasonable

Officer Herbig testified that his only reasons for requesting identification from
Mr. Anderson and running the license through dispatch were "to identify who I was talking to"
3

The State told the district court that under the case law, Mr. Anderson was obligated to give up
his driver's license to Officer Herbig. (See Tr., p.33, Ls.18-25.) That concession is binding on
the State on appeal. Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 722.
4
The district court ruled that,
the defendant consented to letting the officer look at his ID, I fmd under the
circumstances here that that was a valid consent, that it was not coerced, that it
was not involuntary, and that it was an entirely reasonable request of the officer to
do so, and he did nothing to convince the defendant to do so. It was just a simple
request. The defendant could have said no, but he didn 't.
(Tr., p.46, L.16-p.47, L.9.)
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(Tr., p.13, Ls.13-14), "to protect myself from any allegations or anything to that effect" (Tr., p.19,
Ls.12-15), and to create "a log of the name" (Tr., p.20, Ls.7-9). The district court accepted these as
the officer's reasons 5 and noting that the detention was brief, and the intrusion "de minimis,"
concluded that Officer Herbig's conduct was reasonable and found no Fourth Amendment violation.
(Tr., p.47, L.23 - p.48, L.3.) The district court's legal conclusion was erroneous.
a.

A Detention Requires Reasonable Articulable Suspicion

For a seizure to be "reasonable" within the meaning of Fourth Amendment there must be
facts capable of measurement against an objective standard, whether this is probable cause or a
less stringent test. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).

A person may not be

detained, even momentarily, without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so. Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491,498 (1983).
It is unreasonable, and therefore unlawful, for an officer to detain an individual for

questioning absent reasonable articulable suspicion that the person is engaged, or about to be
engaged, in criminal activity, or that he has committed an offense. Rodriguez v. United States,
575 U.S. 348, 353 (2016); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Idaho Supreme Court has held
it is unreasonable for an officer to detain a citizen for the purpose of obtaining his identification
and running a license check absent reasonable suspicion the person is engaged in wrongdoing.
Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 722. Moreover, such unjustified, suspicionless seizures of citizens where the officer lacks reasonable suspicion but wants to ask for identification anyway - are

5

The district also mentioned "safety concerns" and "who knows" as additional reasons.
(Tr., p.47, L.23 - p.48, L.3.) However, these additional reasons are not supported by the
evidence in the record and are clearly erroneous, and therefore they cannot be used to support the
district court's decision. See State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659 (2007) (facts not supported by
the record are clearly erroneous); In re Trottier, 155 Idaho 17, 23 (Ct. App. 2013) (clearly
erroneous factual findings not entitled to deference on appeal).
10

exactly the type of flagrantly unlawful conduct that the Fourth Amendment prohibits. Id. at
724.
The fact a state has enacted a statute requiring the individual to identify himself to police
upon request does not alter the requirement that the officer first must have reasonable suspicion
that justifies detaining the person. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979). As the United
States Supreme Court stated in Brown,
In the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant of misconduct, the balance
between the public interest and appellant's right to personal security and privacy
tilts in favor of freedom from police interference. The Texas statute under which
appellant was stopped and required to identify himself is designed to advance a
weighty social objective in large metropolitan centers: prevention of crime. But
even assuming that purpose is served to some degree by stopping and demanding
identification from an individual without any specific basis for believing he is
involved in criminal activity, the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not
allow it. When such a stop is not based on objective criteria, the risk of arbitrary
and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits.
Id.

Similarly, the fact a statute requires motorists to possess a valid license and to surrender it
upon an officer's request, does not permit an officer to detain the motorist absent reasonable
suspicion. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
While it is true that whenever an officer conducts a valid traffic stop, supported by
reasonable articulable suspicion, 6 the officer is permitted to request the driver's license and
registration, and run license and warrants checks incident to the stop, this is so because these are
inquiries related to the mission of the traffic stop, and are justified by the reasonable suspicion
for the stop. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355. However, the fact that a vehicle and its driver
already are stopped does not justify additional police intrusions, such as the extension of the
6

A traffic stop is justified if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver
has committed an offense, such as a traffic offense, or that the driver is engaged in other
criminal activity, such as driving under the influence. State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 442
(2015).
11

duration of the stop. Rodriquez, 575 U.S. at 355; State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 608 (2016). On
the contrary, for an additional intrusion to be lawful, it must be justified by its own reasonable
suspicion. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355; Linze, 161 Idaho at 608. Even "de minimis" intrusions
violate the Fourth Amendment. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355; Linze, 161 Idaho at 608.
In this case, Officer Herbig testified he was aware of no reports of suspicious activity in
the area and observed no suspicious behavior whatsoever by Mr. Anderson. (Tr., p.18, Ls.2-16.)
According to the undisputed evidence, the officer simply observed Mr. Anderson sitting in a
parked vehicle, parked in a lot waiting for the bus. (Tr., p.18, Ls.2-16.) The officer gave no
legitimate reason, or any reason at all, for initiating the contact with Mr. Anderson.
generally Tr., p.18, L.3 - p.20, L.25.)

(See

However, the record is clear that the he detained

Mr. Anderson solely for the purpose of obtaining his identification and running it through police
dispatch. (Tr., p.18, Ls.2-16.) In other words, Officer Herbig was just fishing.
Because the officer lacked the constitutionally required reasonable suspicion to conduct
even a brief detention, Officer Herbig' s conduct was unreasonable under the circumstances, and
violated Mr. Anderson's Fourth Amendment rights.
b.

The Decisions in State v. Godwin And State v. Landreth Are Not Controlling In
This Case

In the district court, the State filed briefing argumg that the officer's conduct was
reasonable under the holdings of State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 494 (1992), and State v.
Landreth, 139 Idaho 986 (Ct. App. 2004).

(R., pp.47-57.) However, neither of these cases

support Officer Herbig's detention ofMr. Anderson in this case.
In Godwin, an officer stopped a vehicle because of an equipment violation. 121 Idaho at
492. During the stop, another vehicle, driven by Godwin, stopped on the roadside one hundred
yards in front of the first vehicle. Id. While the officer spoke with the driver of the first vehicle,
12

a sheriffs deputy stopped behind Godwin's vehicle.

Id.

The two vehicles were traveling

together and the driver of the first vehicle thought her driver's license was in Godwin's vehicle.
Id. However, Godwin was unable to locate the license. Id. The deputy asked to see Godwin's

license and returned to his patrol car to conduct a driver's license check. Id. Dispatch informed
the deputy that Godwin's license was suspended and Godwin was arrested. Id. A search of
Godwin's vehicle incident to the arrest revealed plastic bags containing cocaine. Id.
In a plurality decision, a fractured majority of the Court agreed Godwin was "seized"
when the deputy retained his license to run a license check and that the seizure was reasonable.
Id. However, in Godwin, unlike in this case, the Court's lead opinion reasoned that the seizure

of Godwin was tethered to the valid traffic stop of the first car because the two cars were
traveling together. Id. Moreover, the officers there were told that the driver's license of the first
vehicle was in Godwin's possession. Id. No such circumstances are present in Mr. Anderson's
case.
In Landreth, the officer responded to a report of suspicious activity in the parking lot of a
grocery store and when he arrived, observed the defendant sitting in a parked vehicle with
extension cords extending from the vehicle to the store, and suspected possible theft of
electricity. 139 Idaho 986. Based on those facts, the officer initiated contact with the defendant,
and, although his suspicions were then dispelled, asked for his driver's license anyway. Id. at
987. Citing the reasoning of the lead opinion in Godwin, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that
the detention was reasonable under the circumstances, even though lacking reasonable suspicion,
because the officer provided an articulable "legitimate reason" for initiating the contact in the
first place. Id. In Mr. Anderson's case, the officer articulated no legitimate reason for initiating
the stop, and the facts provide none. (See generally Tr., p.46, L.3 - p.48, L.9.) On the contrary,

13

Officer Herbig's contact with and decision to detain Mr. Anderson demonstrates the very
unbridled exercise of discretion that the Idaho Supreme Court in Cohagan emphasized 1s
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 162 Idaho at 720 (citing Godwin, 121 Idaho at 492).
D.

The Exclusionary Rule Required Suppression Because The Evidence Was Discovered As
The Result Of The Officer's Illegal Conduct And The State Failed To Argue Any
Exception To Rule
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to the exclusionary

rule, which requires unlawfully seized evidence to be excluded from trial. E.g., Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 720; State v. Page, 140 Idaho at

846. The exclusionary rule requires the suppression of both "primary evidence obtained as a
direct result of an illegal search or seizure" and, pertinent here, "evidence later discovered and
found to be derivative of an illegality," 7 the proverbial "'fruit of the poisonous tree."' Cohagan,
162 Idaho at 721 (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984)) (emphasis
added); see e.g., State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810-11 (2009). The rule "extends as well to the
indirect as the direct products of unconstitutional conduct." Segura, 468 U.S. at 804.
There are, of course, exceptions to the application of the exclusionary rule, three of
which, including the doctrine of attenuation, involve the causal relationship tween the
unconstitutional act and the discovery of the evidence.

Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 721 (citing

Utah v. Strieff, _ U.S._, 136 S.Ct. 2056 (2016)). However, the burden rests with the State to

argue and establish there was "sufficient attenuation" to break the causal connection between the

7

Thus, even if Mr. Anderson was no longer detained when he consented to the search of his
vehicle, the evidence discovered is subject to suppression because it was derived from the
officer's exploitation of the information he had obtained as the direct result of his unlawful
conduct, minutes earlier. The State's argument, below, that the detention was "undone" when
Mr. Anderson's license was returned to him (Tr. p.35, L.2 - p.36, L.18), did not operate to
''undo" the taint of the officer's illegal conduct. Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 721.
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officer's illegal conduct and the discovery of the evidence. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 60304 (1975).
In this case, the evidence found during the search of Mr. Anderson's vehicle was
discovered as the result Officer Herbig' s unlawful conduct. Officer Herbig unlawfully seized
Mr. Anderson and his license and obtained information about Mr. Herbig - specifically that he
was on probation - as the direct result of that illegal conduct. Officer Herbig used the ill-gotten
information to interrogate Mr. Anderson about his probation status and, prior to requesting
consent, make the point that Mr. Anderson's "cooperation" with the officer's requests and the
search would be reported to his probation officer, e.g., "Are you good with me checking, that
way if your PO asks me I can tell him, 'Yeah, I checked him. He was good with it. He was
cooperative."' (See Ex.I, 5:00-5:10.) Mr. Herbig's consent was the product of this question,
and the search and discovery of the evidence, the ultimate fruit of the officer's unlawful conduct.
Notably, the district court's factual finding that Mr. Anderson's consent was "voluntary"
does not operate by itself to break the causal chain; rather, the State must establish "sufficient
attenuation" under a multi-factor test. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) ("The
voluntariness of the statement is a threshold requirement. And the burden of showing
admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution.") Brown v. Illinois was decided shortly after
Wong Sun. In Brown, the United States Supreme Court stated that in order for the causal chain

between the illegal seizure and the subsequent statements to be broken, "Wong Sun requires not
merely that statements be voluntary but that it be 'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the
primary taint."' 422 U.S. at 603-04.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized that these standards apply not only to
confessions, but also to other statements including consent, and that "the same standards apply,

15

requiring the State to prove that the consent was voluntary and not derived by exploitation of an
earlier violation." State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112, 118 (Ct. App. 2007). Where consent to
search is preceded by unlawful police conduct, "the State must also prove that the consent was
not procured by the exploitation of the previous illegality. State v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 446, 472
(Ct. App. 2008) (abrogated on other grounds) (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488); see also
State v. Teitsort, 145 Idaho at 115.

Officer Herbig' s unlawful seizure of Mr. Anderson and the running of his license through
dispatch preceded the giving of consent to search and the ensuring discovery of the drug
evidence.

(Ex. I, 2: 10-5 :40.)

Thus, the consent and subsequent search do not prevent the

application of the exclusionary rule, absent a showing of sufficient attenuation Cf Cohagan, 162
Idaho at 722 (holding that that discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant, though it compelled
the arrest and authorized the lawful search incident that ultimately revealed the drug evidence,
was an intervening circumstance that weighed in favor of attenuation under the multi-factor test,
but was outweighed by the flagrancy and purposefulness of the preceding illegal detention
Fourth Amendment violation - which, like in this case, was the unjustified, suspicionless
detention of a citizen to request identification).
Additionally, because the State failed even to argue there was sufficient attenuation, or
that any other exception to the exclusionary rule applied, it has waived the issue. State v.
Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, _, 443 P.3d 231,240 (2019) (rejecting the State's request for a remand

to determine the application of exceptions to exclusionary rule, where the State had failed to
argue any exception in the district court).

CONCLUSION
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Mr. Anderson respectfully asks that this Court reverse the district court's order denying
suppression, vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand his case to the district court to
permit him to withdraw his guilty plea.
DATED this 12th day of December, 2019.
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